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                              ABSTRACT
BUDGETARY EFFICIENCY IN TURKEY:
 LOCAL –CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF FISCAL FEDERALISM
Zafer Akin
M.A. in Economics
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Bilin Neyaptı
June, 2001
The role and the functions of different levels of government are controversial
issues. Together with increasing the importance of the local governments,
decentralization has also gained importance. In this study, we examine local-central
government relationships in Turkey, which has a strongly centralized government
structure, by inspecting the status of decentralization. We empirically investigate the
critical points mentioned in traditional fiscal federalism theories by using a provincial
data set. Our study briefly reveals that there has not been a trend toward expenditure
decentralization in Turkey. Although a slight trend toward tax decentralization is
observed, local governments in Turkey do not have ability to improve their own
revenues. In addition, we do not see any significant compensatory policy of the central
government against the shocks realized in the macroeconomic environment. A supporting
policy of the national government is observed in the priority regions for development and
in agricultural regions. Finally, our study on social indicators showed that there are
significant uneven distribution of health facilities and inequalities among different
income groups. In education case, we observe that education facilities are more even
across provinces as compared to health facilities.
Keywords: Decentralization, fiscal federalism, local governments and budgetary
efficiency.
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ÖZET
TURKİYE’DEKİ BÜTÇE VERİMLİLİĞİ: MALİ FEDERALİZM
AÇISINDAN YEREL VE MERKEZİ YÖNETİM İLİŞKİLERİ
                                           Zafer Akın
                          Ekonomi Bölümü Yüksek Lisans
                      Danışman: Yard. Doç. Bilin Neyaptı
                                         Haziran, 2001
Günümüzde farklı seviyedeki devlet yönetimlerinin rolleri ve fonksiyonları çok
tartışılmaktadır. Yerel yönetimlerin önemi hızla arttığından dolayı, yerelleşme de günden güne
önem kazanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, yerelleşme konusunu gözönüne alarak, güçlü bir merkezi
yönetim sistemine sahip olan Türkiye’deki yerel ve merkezi yönetim ilişkilerini inceledik. İl
bazında bir veri kümesi kullanarak, geleneksel mali federalizm teorilerinde vurgulanan önemli
noktaları yakalamaya çalıştık. Çalışmamızın önemli bulguları şunlardır: Türkiye’de harcamaya
yönelik önemli bir yerelleşme eğilimi yoktur. Buna karşın, vergi yerelleşmesine yönelik zayıf
bulgular elde etmemize rağmen, Türkiye’deki yerel yönetimlerin temelini oluşturan belediyeler
özkaynaklarını arttırma kabiliyetine yeterince sahip değildir. Ek olarak, merkezi yönetimin
ekonomide gerçekleşen şoklara karşı gerekli mali politikaları üretemediğini gözledik. Merkezi
yönetimin kalkınmada öncelikli yörelerde ve tarımsal bölgelerde destekleyici rol oynadığını
gözledik. Son olarak, sosyal göstergeler üzerindeki çalışmalarımız sağlık imkanlarının
dağılımında önemli eşitsizlikler ve değişik gelir düzeyi grupları arasında sağlık imkanları
açısından büyük farklılıklar olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. İller bazında incelendiğinde, eğitim
alanında, sağlık imkanlarına nazaran daha adil bir paylaşım ve dağılım olduğunu gözlemledik.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yerelleşme, mali federalizm, yerel yönetimler ve bütçe verimliliği.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The role and the functions of different levels of the government are controversial
issues. However, it is commonly viewed that the government structure should be handled
and contemplated carefully in the light of federalism and decentralization. In order to
provide sustained growth and development – at least macroeconomic stability - in a
market economy, one can claim that highly centralized and economically interventionist
government structure should be transformed into one that encourages decentralized
economic activities, whose functions are specified properly to complement markets.
Decentralization, which can be defined as the transfer of power and authority to
local administrations, can improve the allocation of resources and make it more efficient
by making the process of fiscal decisions closer to public preferences. In terms of
allocation, the limited resources, available public goods, and the population preferences
can be matched easier in a decentralized government than a centralized one. Fiscal
federalism can be basically defined as the division of tax collection and expenditure
assignments among different levels of the government. Decentralization and fiscal
federalism both have political and economic aspects. Also, they have almost the same
indications like the devolution of discretion from central to local levels and increasing
importance of local levels in order to achieve an efficient allocation of resources.
Decentralization and fiscal federalism have recently gained importance. Political
and fiscal decentralization is now under way in many countries and regions such as the
2Central and Eastern Europe, China, former Soviet Union and Latin America.
Economically, decentralization has become more important with the recognition that it is
necessary to utilize public resources more efficiently now than in the past. Politically, it
represents an attempt towards more privatization and liberalization.
There are two related but distinct theories about fiscal federalism and its
economical benefits, traditional and new federalism theories. Allocative benefits of
federalism are emphasized in traditional theories. Von Hayek (1945), who is one of the
pioneers in this area, focused on the informational benefits of federalism. Because local
governments have better access to local information, they can provide local goods and
services more efficiently than the national government. Tiebout (1956) proposed a model
of local finance that presents a chance to individuals to look for a community that is best
suited to their tastes by providing a menu of outputs. This sorting mechanism, according
to Tiebout, can be provided by inter-jurisdictional competition. Musgrave (1959) and
Oates (1972) posited a theory of fiscal federalism stating that readjusting the tax and
expenditure assignments between different levels of the government may result in
improved welfare of the society. In order to improve the welfare and the policy
responsiveness to the needs and demands, the transfer of more power and authority to
elected local administrations is very important (Oates, 1972).
In this growing literature, we have recently faced with new theories. These new
theories approach to the issue from a different perspective (such as Qian and Weingast,
1997). They have two new points of view. First is the question: Which circumstances
foster the local government to maximize the local welfare? Second is approaching to
fiscal issues in terms of the general relationships between government and economic
agent by not assuming a benevolent government.
The basic implication of these new theories is that some types of federalism and
decentralization can provide governments with better incentives to support market
development and economic prosperity than others. Federalism, by devolution of authority
from central to local levels, can prevent central government’s interventionist behaviors.
The first mechanism to foster local government’s interest with economic prosperity is
3that because of inter-jurisdictional competition, heavily interventionist local governments
may loss valuable factors of production to less interventionist jurisdictions. Second, if the
expenditures and revenues of local governments are strongly related to each other, then,
the officials of the local government are required to support the local economy.
These theoretical approaches together with the empirical studies and research on
different country cases have made this topic very popular. As people around the world
are becoming more aware of the importance of influence and participation process in the
decisions of their governments, all countries should respond to this demand sufficiently. 
In this study, we try to shed light on local and central government relations in
Turkey by inspecting the status of decentralization. Turkey has a strongly centralized
government structure, which is inherited from Ottoman Empire and there is no specific or
intended policy or program towards a more decentralized government structure as of
today. In addition, there is no specific study about where Turkey stands in the framework
of federalism and decentralization. However, as it is very important to know the present
situation of Turkey in this framework, to formulate policies for the future and not to lag
behind the general tendency toward decentralization in the world, this area should be
studied carefully.
Based on the previous studies on budgetary systems of municipalities, which are
main local government units in Turkey, we can say that local governments are highly
dependent on the central government in terms of their fiscal structures. This can be
observed easily, if we examine the juridical and fiscal procedures between municipalities
and central government. Approval or prepermission of Ministry of Interior is needed for
budgets, borrowings, pricing of services of municipalities and also for grants and
transfers to municipalities. In addition to these fiscal inspections, Ministry of Interior has
discretion on municipalities to demote the mayor and to appoint some bureaucrats
directly. As a result of this lack of autonomy, the Ministry of Interior has recently
changed approximately 75% of all the decisions of councils of municipalities (see Falay
et al.). Moreover, taxes and tariffs cannot be adjusted against inflation and price and
income movements such as property and environment cleaning tax rates are determined
in every 5 years. Thus, own-revenues of municipalities in ratio of total revenues
decreased to 20% after 1970 while it was 40 to 60% between 1925-1970.
4Using a provincial data set, we empirically investigate firstly whether there is a
tendency toward decentralization and secondly the expenditure and tax collection
efficiency in Turkey. We first look at the bivariate relationships between relevant
variables in order to constitute a general idea about their basic relationships. These guide
us in our regression analysis. We then examine the multivariate relationships among our
variables in the light of descriptive statistics. In the regression analysis, we expect to
capture some of relationships that are either not very clear or not observed in the bivariate
case. By examining the relationships of central and local expenditures and taxes with
other budgetary efficiency variables, we get an idea about the present situation of Turkey
vis a vis traditional theories. We are not able to apply the new theories to our case
because we do not have sufficient data for the market structure and performance.
Our major findings reveal the following. While there is no significant trend
towards expenditure decentralization in Turkey, we observe a slight trend towards tax
decentralization. However, we also find that the lion’s share of the total taxes collected in
a province goes to the central government while municipalities cannot increase their tax
revenues as GDP increases as much as the central government can.
As a result of our examination of the relationships between expenditure and
agricultural production, we observe a noticeable policy of less tax collection and more
expenditure in regions where agricultural production is dense, which can be interpreted as
a kind of compensation policy of central government. This compensation policy of less
tax collection and more expenditure is also observed in priority regions for development
and emergency state regions.
We observe a positive correlation between private investment incentives given by
central government and income level. When we look at the responsiveness of the central
government to shocks realized in the macroeconomic environment, we do not see any
significant compensatory policy of the national government against the volatility in GDP.
The social indicators are helpful variables in terms of the understanding of
budgetary efficiency of governments. In this study, we use two social indicator variables,
which are health measured by people per doctor and education measured by students per
teacher. In case of health, our findings indicate that municipal and central spending are
not enough in the provision of health services to individuals that belong to different
5income groups. In case of education, again there is a slightly significant uneven
distribution, though the local and central governments’ education spending are more fair
across provinces than in the case of health.
As we do not have an access to all the necessary data for time-series analysis,
specifically constrained by local governments data, we were not able to conduct the
detailed analysis that we wished to. Because of limited data, we perform a cross-sectional
analysis by using the data from the last decade. Since we do not have time-series
analysis, however, we have difficulty in interpreting some of the results and we cannot
observe the time behavior in our major variables.
In chapter 2, the theory about fiscal federalism and decentralization and central
and local government structures is described in more detail. Descriptive statistics
focusing on the bivariate relationships between the variables is in chapter 3. The
methodology and regression analysis are described in chapter 4. Chapter 5 is the
conclusion.
6Chapter 2
Theory and Background
The aim and the fundamental reason of the existence of government is the
maximization of social welfare as individuals’ aim is utility maximization, firms’ aim is
profit maximization and politicians’ aim is vote maximization. Because, day by day, the
market structure has grown and these markets need to have a regulatory power, the need
for government has increased and it has became an inevitable phenomenon in the
economic life. On the other hand, the uncontrolled growth of markets has made the
distribution of income unfair. This causes the government to behave as a social regulator
in the society. In our century, the social and economic role of government in the society
and its functions and structure are debatable topics. The vertical structure of the public
sector has important implications for the way in which government functions. It affects
the kind of government services, how they are financed, the potential for innovation and
even the overall size of government. We can summarize all these with some questions as
the following: what is the need for government? What is the role of government in the
economy? How should the functions be distributed among different levels of the
government? How should the revenue and expenditure structures of them be? etc.
In section 2.1, the basic role of the government is presented. The allocation of
functions among different levels of government is in section 2.2. Section 2.3 is about the
7key elements of local administrations. We describe the theoretical perspectives on the
benefits and costs of decentralization in section 2.4. Local government structure in
Turkey is in section 2.5.
2.1 The Role of Government
Market failure is the basic reason for the need for government. Reaching an
optimal allocation of resources rising from individual decision-making is a difficult
process. Some classical and well-known assumptions should be made, such as informing
people about the choices open to them, no monopoly power, no externalities, no public
goods and perfect mobility of capital and labor.
Government intervention may also be necessary to secure the desired distribution
of income. The Pareto criterion, being concerned only with economic efficiency, does not
concern distributional issues. Since markets cannot produce the desired distributional
outcome easily, governments have a key role in redistribution.
The most basic rationale for government intervention is the failure of market
mechanism, there are other reasons like externalities and public goods provision.
However, the government action does not guarantee a better situation. This depends on
the capacity of government to respond sensitively to the needs and preferences of
individuals and communities, and on its ability to obtain and process the necessary
information. These possibilities limit the ability of governments to respond the market
failure.
The possibility of improvement of failures with the help of the government
intervention varies from case to case. An important element in the ability of governments
to process information and to make appropriate decisions is the organizational structure
of government. This is one of the main crucial things to think about in terms of
decentralization.
The information processing of particular individuals or communities is healthier
in decentralized governments. Politically and democratically more decentralized
governments may also be more capable in reflecting the preferences of individuals.
However, both of these advantages of decentralization must be weighted against the
advantages of centralization in terms of administrative economies of scale, and against
the need for central or national solutions to some of the problems of market failure.
8Different policy targets bring different weights and determine the allocation of particular
functions to central or local level. The proper degree of decentralization independent of
the characteristics of the goods and services provided does not have a certain answer.
Decentralization itself is neither good nor bad. The issue is whether it is successful or not
(see World Bank, World Development Report, 2000). Successful decentralization
improves the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector while accommodating
potentially explosive political forces. Unsuccessful decentralization threatens economic
and political stability and disrupts the delivery of public services. The success of
decentralization depends on its design.
2.2 Allocation of Functions among Levels of the
Government
In order to understand decentralization of government and the rationale behind a
decentralized government better, we should basically try to specify the functions of the
different levels of the government. In the existing public-finance literature, a popular
approach to this issue makes use of Musgrave’s (1959) tripartite division of the public
sector. Considering each of Musgrave’s three functions of the public sector will be
helpful to capture the idea of decentralization.
Macroeconomic Stability:
The proper form and scope of macroeconomic policies to stabilize the economy at
high levels of output and employment together with reasonable price stability is a very
controversial topic of today as well as the past. In spite of this controversy, it can be
claimed that the exercise of counter-cyclical policy must rest with the central
government.
This claim is has two aspects. First, the basic control over the money supply and
credit is exercised by central government in nearly all countries. If each level of
government has the right of creating and destroying money, there would exist a powerful
incentive for local governments to finance their purchases of goods and services with
local taxation. The aggregate result would obviously be a rapid national monetary
expansion with concurrent inflationary pressures.
9Second, regional or local economies tend to be highly open such that they import
and export relatively large shares of the goods that they produce and consume. Such
openness implies serious constraints on the capacity of decentralized governments to be
responsible for counter-cyclical fiscal measures. If a local government, for example, were
to undertake a substantial tax cut to stimulate the local economy, such an event happens
that most of the newly generated spending would flow out of the local economy in
payment for goods and services produced elsewhere with little ultimate effect on local
levels of employment which is the main aim of the tax cut.
In brief, the absence of monetary rights and the openness of regional or local
economies suggest that the potential for effective macroeconomic stabilization policy is
quite limited at decentralized levels of the public sector. Thus, the central government
having broad monetary and fiscal powers should have the primary role for an active
counter-cyclical policy.
Income Distribution:
The other function of the public sector is the redistribution of income to achieve a
socially just outcome. This typically implies a transfer of funds to low-income
households to reach a somewhat more equal distribution of income. Again, local levels
have some serious constraints to achieve this objective. First, when we think of in terms
of perceiving poor relief and the well being of the poor elsewhere as a national goal,
purely local policies cannot cover the income transfers throughout the nation that is the
way should be pursued. Redistributive measures from this perspective are a “national
public good” that requires a central-government presence.
Second, the capacity of decentralized governments to redistribute income can be
limited by the potential mobility of households and firms. If a local government, for
example, were to undertake program to redistribute income equally among poor and rich
people, it would create compelling incentives for high-income people to move elsewhere
and for low-income people to immigrate into the jurisdiction. Thus, such movements
create a process that is not desirable from the perspective of most jurisdictions.
The Provision of Public Goods and Services:    
Decentralized levels of government have their primary rationale in the provision
of public goods and services. There are certain public goods, like national defense and
10
foreign policy, which benefit all members of a nation, that the central government is
obviously the appropriate agent for providing such national public services. In contrast,
the responsibility of many other public services belongs to local governments, including
such things as refuse-collection system, local fire protection and many others. For such
services, there is a compelling argument for decentralized provision. Centralized control
tends to result in relatively uniform levels of services across local jurisdictions.
Decentralized provision of services, in contrast, provides the scope for adapting
levels of output to the circumstances and tastes of individual jurisdictions. People
suggesting the local control over these local goods and services say that the magnitude of
the welfare losses from the uniform provision of public services can be quite sizeable and
the levels of local services should be adjusted to the tastes of local constituencies.
2.3 Key Elements of Local Governments
Local accountability, fiscal autonomy and decentralization are the most important
concepts in local government literature. How they are defined and measured, however, is
debatable. The issues of local autonomy and local accountability are closely linked
because the main reason for giving local government some fiscal jurisdictions is to
encourage local accountability. Local accountability can enable promoting a more
efficient allocation of resources and encouraging cost containment at the local level. This
is the main rationale of decentralization.
Local accountability requires that the revenue to finance locally determined
expenditures should be passed on to the local electorate either through taxation or user
charges. This process becomes easy, if local governments have their own tax resources
and are able to fix the tax rates by reference to the level of local services asked for by
their local electorates. On this basis, it has been argued that there is a case for relatively
large local taxes to finance, such as grants, over which the local government authorities
may have little or no control. Thus, local government should be accountable to the local
electorate.
Local fiscal autonomy depends upon the degree of discretion available to local
government. Autonomy refers to revenues, grants or expenditures. Fiscal autonomy
requires that local governments should be able to change the level and composition of its
revenues. The revenue sources for local government are briefly following: own taxes,
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overlapping taxes, non-tax revenues, shared taxes, general-purpose grants and specific
grants. In practice, most of these instruments are subject to detailed controls by central
government. For example, own taxes are almost always subject to constraints on the base
and rates. In terms of autonomy, different kinds of grants offer different degrees of
discretion to beneficiary governments. There are also different kinds of grants such as
project specific grants, general-purpose grants and sector specific grants. The nature of
the expenditure programs carried out by local governments is important in terms of local
autonomy. Decision on the allocation of functions is the first way in which central
government influences local autonomy over expenditure. Central government can
constrain local autonomy by setting specific standards for each function that is carried out
by local government. In education, for example, central government may determine the
curricula, set ratio of teacher to pupil, teaching standards, etc. Here local government has
no or little discretion and merely acts as an agent for carrying out centrally determined
policies. Central government may leave local authorities entirely free as to whether or not
they provide certain services and, if they do, the way in which the service is
implemented.
Fiscal decentralization can be approached in three ways in the local level. The
first is to decentralize the share of taxing and expenditure responsibility of lower levels of
government. For example, in Denmark, local governments have substantial social welfare
expenditure responsibilities as well as authority of taxing powers. It is hypothesized that
local government shares of total taxes and expenditure is a good measure of the extent of
this type of decentralization (Owen and Panella, 1991). The second approach is to
decentralize expenditure responsibility but not the taxing authority, and to finance the gap
with intergovernmental grants. Under this approach to decentralization, it could be
expected to observe a higher sub-national government expenditure share, a smaller tax
share, and a greater dependence on grants. The third approach is administrative or
political decentralization of central government activities, i.e., giving more fiscal
discretion to regional offices of various ministries or departments, involving local
governments more directly in decisions regarding the allocation of central funds within
region, etc. The third approach may not be quantified easily, but the statistical annex
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provides information about the shares of different levels of government in overall
revenue and expenditures.
Although we mention about the decentralization and fiscal federalism above in
the framework of government structure and functions, a brief literature survey will also
be given below.
2.4 Theories of Decentralization and Federalism: The
Traditional and New Perspectives
Two different but related theoretical perspectives examine the economic effects of
decentralization. Efficient allocation of scarce resources is the basic problem in this area.
The traditional theories emphasize this point for informational reasons. There are two
related ideas. The first one belongs to Hayek (1945) stating the crucial advantages of
local decision-making process in terms of best using the local information. As the local
conditions and the problems are known better by local governments than the national
government and the transfer of information is problematic, local governments can have a
better role in providing the local goods and services than the national government.
The second one is of Tiebout (1956). He presented a simple model, which yields a
solution for the local level of expenditure for local goods that reflects the preferences of
the individuals more adequately than can be reflected at the national level. His approach
focuses on the inter-jurisdictional competition. According to Tiebout, this kind of
competition among local governments on local expenditure allocation presents an
opportunity to the residents to look for a community that is the most suitable one for
themselves in terms of the provided local goods. In a centralized government structure
where the provision of public goods is uniform, this kind of segregation mechanism
cannot be achieved. Inman (1988), Buchanan and Brennan (1980) showed that inter-
jurisdictional competition approach of Tiebout could limit local governments’ behaviors.
In the light of these ideas, Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) constituted a theoretical
perspective of decentralization stating that there can be achieved an improvement in the
welfare of society by making appropriate assignments of taxes and expenditures to the
various levels of government.
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Following a large literature in this area, there appear some new approaches to this
issue that emphasize the ignored aspects of the benefits of decentralization (McKinnon,
1997; Weingast, 1997). Weingast and Qian in their paper (1997) ask the following
question: how do governments commit to providing efficient local goods and preserving
market incentives? They apply the theory of firm to address a range of problems in
federal systems. The new theories do not accept the assumption of benevolent
government with full commitment power. They mainly tackle the general regulation over
economic activities or the state-market relations. Also they point out that very powerful
and not controlled government intervention may be very harmful and malevolent to
market preservation and regulation.
There are some important differences between new and traditional theories as the
new theories concern with government incentives and state-market relations more than
the traditional one. The main difference is in the transfers between central and local
governments. The traditional theory, assuming benevolent government, claims that
expenditure decentralization should be realized because of informational benefits of local
levels. But it also considers the probability of the creation of bad allocation and the
restricting of fiscal power of central government, which maintains the macroeconomic
stability and equality among regions may be harmful for economic prosperity purposes.
Because of these concerns, traditional theory says that the dependence of local
governments to their own revenue collection to finance their expenditure is undesirable.
Sizeable transfers from central to local governments are considered necessary to finance
the expenditures of local governments.
The new federalism theories, in contrast, are more concerned with government
incentives and focus on the importance of linking the financing local expenditures to the
own revenues of local governments in order to attract the attention of them to local
economic prosperity. According to new theories, the revenue distribution made in the
spirit of traditional theories is harmful both to government’s positive incentives and its
financial discipline. The scenario also provides that the local governments’ officials are
responsible for their actions in the expenditures but in traditional theories, when the
transfer revenue is the large portion of total revenue of local governments, the officials
may perform the expenditures carelessly and inefficiently.
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Strong fiscal incentives together with limited transfers from central government
can foster local governments to realize the market reforms better. Zhuravskaya (1998), by
using a simple model, examined the effects of the fiscal incentives for local governments
on markets. First finding is that the strong fiscal incentives encourage local governments
to put fewer restrictions on non-state enterprises. As more restrictions on enterprises
reduce the revenue that is obtained by local governments, they increase their revenues by
making restrictions flexible. Second, local governments facing with strong incentives try
to make state-owned enterprises more productive and well performing. Third, because
local governments obtain limited transfer, they make their expenditures and investments
more carefully and they tend to provide more productive local goods and investments.
In China, which has realized an extensive reform, Weingast, Hehui and Qian
(1999) showed that local governments are faced with strong fiscal incentives to pursue
market reform. They find a strong correlation between local government’s revenue
collection and expenditures. They also find that the reform improves horizontal
distribution across provinces in budgetary spending. As in the case of Russia, stronger
fiscal incentives imply better economic performance, faster development of non-state
enterprises and more reform in state-owned enterprises.
Dillenger and Webb (1999), in their paper concerning fiscal management in
Colombia, observe a problematic case of decentralization trial. Because of the defective
design of decentralization, Colombia has experienced some weakening of
macroeconomic performance especially in the last decade. The decentralization has led to
some problems, both in maintaining fiscal balance at the national level, as resources are
transferred to sub national levels, and in preventing unsustainable deficits by the sub
national governments. The problems have appeared because national government
interference prevents departments from controlling their costs and because sub national
governments have come to expect debt bailouts. Briefly, the fiscal problems of the
national government in the 1990s mostly originated on the spending side for items not
related to decentralization. The requirement to share all revenues with the sub national
governments meant that the national government could not balance the budget just by
raising taxes. The continued increase in transfers to the municipalities made the problems
of the center worse.
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This is a bad application of traditional fiscal federalism theory. Because it
foresees expenditure decentralization but not revenue decentralization and it proposes to
finance the local expenditures mostly with central transfers for the allocative and
distributional purposes of the national government. However, in the case of Colombia ,
because of not determining all the arrangements and rules about the transfer system, this
causes the creation of soft budget constraints for local governments, which means that
they have come to expect debt bailouts by central government. In order to control sub
national indebtedness, the national government of Colombia is currently working through
both the borrowing-demand and the credit-supply channels (Webb and Dillenger, 1999).
2.5 Local Governments in Turkey
Decentralization issue is widely debatable in Turkey because the relationships
between central and local governments appear mostly inefficient (see Falay, Kalaycıoğlu
and Özkırımlı, 1996). In contrast to most developing countries, Turkey currently does not
have a specific program for a more decentralized government structure. When compared
with the industrialized countries, Turkish government seems highly centralized. While
sub-national levels of government are responsible for over 35 percent of total government
expenditure in industrialized countries, in Turkey the underlying figure is about 10-11
percent. This percentage is between 12 and 15 on average in Latin American countries
(Stein, 1997). Although, in the last decade, for example, decentralization tendency in
Latin America is strong, in Turkey the percentage value decreased to 10.2 in 1998 from
11.7 in 1995.
In Turkey, municipalities are the main units in terms of representation of local
government structure. Fiscal governance and budgetary process of municipalities became
more apparent and important as a consequence of the increasing importance and
problems of provinces. This increasing pattern enforced central government to take some
financial, discretionary and legislative precautions. There was an attempt in 1984 to
improve the political and economic structures of the municipalities, which is the
enactment of the ‘Statue concerning the administration of metropolitan municipalities’
(Act No. 3030). However, by now, it has been realized that this act is not the proper
remedy of the existing problems (Falay et al., 1996). There were also some attempts to
improve the budgetary structure of local governments but again they could not solve the
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problems completely. According to Falay et al. (1996), local governments are not strong
enough in terms of possessing financial resources and generating new resources. Local
governments’ budget revenues are not enough because the shares that they take from
central government’s total tax revenue is not enough and they have no discretion of
creating new income sources.
           In terms of budgetary magnitude, Turkish local governments include villages,
provincial offices and municipalities. Villages, provincial offices and municipalities
cover financially 1%, 14% and 85%, respectively, of the total Turkish local governments’
budget. Villages are local government units in which most of the services are provided by
other local government units. On the other hand, municipalities are the main parts of the
local governments.
According to a report by the State Planning Organization (2001), provincial
offices, on average, gave 15% of the budgetary surplus between 1983 and 1998. While
provincial offices were working with surplus, on the contrary, municipalities were in
budgetary debt in all years and made an extra 6 % expenditure, on average, in addition to
their budgets.
As of the end of 1995, the number of municipalities was 2802. This number
increased year by year and it reached 3227 at the end of 1999. In Turkey, the urbanization
rate is 66% and the ratio of people living in municipalities is realized as 81% in 2000.
Similarly, 40% of the total population lives in metropolitan municipalities.
Revenue side
Local governments in Turkey have three main sources of revenue. The first one is
the Shares Taken from Consolidated Budget Tax Revenue (STCBTR) for provincial
offices and municipalities, the second is self-revenues and the third is borrowing. The
allocation of the first part of the revenues is as follows:
• 6% to municipalities according to population,
• 1.14% to provincial offices,
• 3% to municipalities fund,
• 0.25% to local governance fund, (Local Governments Fund)
• 0.28% to provincial offices fund,
• 0.28% to local governance fund,
17
0.53% of revenues for local governance fund allocated as follows:
• 0.35% to local governance fund (Ministry of Interior Affairs),
• 0.18% to local governance fund (Ministry of Public Works and Housing),
Metropolitan municipalities also take 5% revenue from STCBTR. There are also other
types of funds such as ministry of Culture fund, touristic municipalities fund and
environment cleaning fund.
According to the budget structure (Appendix 2, table B), revenues can be
separated into three parts: tax revenues, nontax revenues and borrowings. While revenues
from STCBTR under tax revenues includes transfers from central governments, local
taxes and nontax revenues constitutes the own revenues. Borrowings are financed from
two sources: domestic borrowing and foreign borrowing. This part of the revenues has
showed a continuously increasing pattern that it was approximately 8% of the total
revenue in 1983 but it increased to 20% in 1998.The municipalities basically pay the
second one back but these borrowings are guaranteed by the Treasury. These revenues
are included in self-revenues. Municipality revenues significantly increased between
1983 and 1998. After 1980, revenue system of municipalities, which were basically
financed by transfers from center and self-revenues, started to use borrowing as another
source of financing. The ratio of borrowings in the whole budget was 8% in 1983 but it
increased to 20% level in 1998.
The STCBTR constitutes on average, 45% of the total revenue of municipalities.
This figure is 54% for metropolitan municipalities and 40% for other municipalities. The
45% percent of tax transfer from center is similar to that of the developed countries. If we
think in terms of reaching to the national target of prosperity over the country and
preventing the income distribution differences across the country, this ratio is normal.
Thus, local governments should be compensated financially by central government
according to their needs. Even if the transfer ratio from the center is at ideal level, which
is assumed as the level of developed countries, the amount of total revenues of
municipalities are not enough to balance the expenditures and they persistently incur debt
in their budget because of this inadequate revenue sources.
There are basically two remedies of this problem and one of them may be applied
in Turkey to solve this crucial problem. First, the tax transfer ratio from center should be
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increased to a level that is sufficient for municipalities to balance their budget. Second,
new revenue sources should be created for municipalities and the necessary financial and
legislative regulations should be made (see also, Falay et al.).
Expenditure Side
According to budget structure, municipality expenditures can be separated into
three: investment, transfer and current expenditures. Each category has an important sub-
category: structure building; debt service and personal expenditures have priority in these
expenditure breakdowns, respectively (Table C).
At the beginning of 1983, the ratios of investment, transfer and current
expenditures were 25%, 13% and 62%, respectively.  In 1998, however, it became as
follows; 27%, 35% and 38%, respectively. For current expenditures, the ratio of personal
expenditures was 44% in 1983 but it decreased to 25% in 1998.
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Chapter 3
Descriptive Statistics and Data
Turkey has a highly centralized government that is inherited from the Ottoman
Empire. We can also say that in our traditional system, it is very important to have a
hierarchical structure among the discretions of different levels of the government.
However, as the need for local goods provided by local governments increases, there has
been an increase in importance of local governments, which are the main units of
administrations responsible for local needs. In this study, we attempt to examine Turkey’s
recent situation in terms of this important process by looking at the local-central
government relationships.
In our study, we compile a large provincial data set and produce descriptive
statistics on the local and central governments of Turkey. There are currently 81 cities in
Turkey with the addition of new ones. We try to reach all necessary data for our analysis.
However, especially for new cities and for some variables, we do not have an access to
all time-series data. In order to make the representation of this data easier, Appendix 1
provides the list of variables, abbreviations, data ranges, data sources and availability of
data for each province. In the remainder of this chapter, we mainly examine basic
relationships between these variables.
We first delineate the economic activities of local-central governments with the
help of some descriptive statistics. To do that, we specifically look at the relationships
between expenditures and revenues of both local and central governments with the level
of per capita GDP, agricultural value added and income indicators such as the ratio of top
%20 income to bottom %20 income (available for only 19 large cities). We also examine
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the relationships of various breakdowns of government spending with the level of per
capita income and its distribution. In addition, we look at the correlation between social
indicators, which are education and health, and other budgetary variables. These
relationships help us to understand the dimensions of the existing problems as well as to
produce some hypotheses about them. These will guide us when we perform the
regression analysis.
3.1 Central and Municipal Expenditures
We first examine the expenditures of the central government and local
municipalities across the provinces. To do that, we look at the average of real per capita
budget expenditures of both center Avg(rEXPcpc)i and municipalities Avg(rEXPmpc)i.
We plot (Avg(rEXPcpc)i and Avg(rEXPmpc)i) versus real per capita gross domestic
product (rGDPpci) (Figures 1.1-1.2). We observe that while rGDPpci is increasing, the
average expenditure of center is slightly decreasing. This negative relationship is intuitive
and reflects efficiency in the sense that it appears as government allocate more
expenditure to provinces with lower rGDPpc. However, in the municipality expenditures
case, we see a positive relationship, which either means that municipalities in higher
income provinces spend more or that in provinces where municipalities spend more,
income becomes higher. These results give some hints about the segragation of
communities according to their income that is implicated by Tiebout model.
The expenditure side of decentralization is very important because unless local
governments have autonomy over their expenditure, decentralization process cannot be
realized properly. In this conjunction, we next plot real per capita expenditures of
municipalities (rEXPmpc) versus real per capita budget expenditure of the central
government (rEXPcpc) (Figure 1.3). We cannot see any relationship between them. In a
country pursuing a decentralization process in terms of expenditure autonomy, we expect
a negative relationship between central and municipal per capita expenditures (Webb,
Dillenger, 1999). As we do not see a negative correlation in Turkey, we may say that
Turkey’s expenditure policy is not sufficiently in favor of decentralization.
In order to find the relationship between agricultural value added and
expenditures, we plot them and we observe a slightly positive relationship between per
capita local government expenditures and real per capita agricultural value added
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(Avg(EXPmpc)i versus Avg(rVAagrpc)i) (Figures 1.4-1.5). In the case of per capita real
expenditure of center versus per capita rVAagr, we do not see any relationship. The
positive relationship in the case of municipalities means that in agricultural regions, the
role of municipal budget expenditures is higher than others. We also look at the real per
capita investment expenditure (rInvEXPcpc) versus rVAagrpc and we come up with a
slight negative relationship (Figure 1.6). This means that agricultural regions may be
getting less investment spending than others.
We also look at the relationship between expenditures and the number of
taxpayers (NuTAXp). In per capita expenditures, there is no relationship between
rEXPcpc and NuTAXp and there is a positive relationship between rEXPmpc and
NuTAXp (Figures 1.7-1.8). If we think of the number of taxpayers as the magnitude of
registered economy in a province, then we observe that when it increases, the
municipality expenditures of that province also increase.
Income distribution is a very crucial concept in the context of budgetary
efficiency. The relationships of our variables with the indicators of provincial level
income distribution yield us significant hints about budgetary efficiency. There is a
positive correlation between per capita income of top and bottom 20 % of households and
per capita real budget expenditures of municipalities but there is no correlation for central
expenditures (Figures 1.9-1.10 and Figures 1.11-1.12). Positive relationship may be
interpreted in two different ways. First, when people become wealthier they receive more
and this is not a good result for efficiency. On the other hand, when expenditure increases
across provinces, wealth of people improves then this is an efficient result. Since our
study does not involve time series analysis, we are unable to address these two directions
of the reasoning.
Instead of income of top and bottom % 20 (Top20 and Bot20), we can use the
ratio of Bot20 to rGDPpci (Avg(Bot20/GDPpc)i) and the ratio of Top20 to rGDPpc of
Turkey (Avg(Top20i/GDPpc) as variables for income distribution. For real per capita
municipality expenditures, there is a negative relationship with Avg(Bot20i/GDPpci), but
in Avg(Top20i/GDPpci) case, there is no relationship (Figures 1.13 and 1.14). For real
per capita central expenditures, there is no correlation with Avg(Bot20i/GDPpci), but in
Avg(Top20i/GDPpci) case, there is a slightly positive relationship which may be an
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indication of inefficient budgetary expenditure pattern across provinces (Figure 1.15 and
1.16). However, due to small number of data points, we need to interpret the above
results, which are based on income data of 19 provinces only, with caution.
3.2 Central and Local Tax Revenues
We secondly examine the characteristics of local and central tax revenue
collection. The relationship between average of real per capita tax revenue for both
central and local governments (rTAXcpci and rTAXmpci) and rGDPpc is positive
(Figures 2.1-2.2). This is expected because when people have more income, they should
pay more tax and this indicates the above result. We also observe that when the number
of taxpayers increases, central and municipal real per capita tax revenues increase
(Figures 2.3-2.4). This positive relationship is also valid for both government levels, if
we use tax revenue per taxpayer instead of tax revenue (Figures 2.5-2.6). In addition to
this, when we plot real per capita tax revenue of municipalities versus real per capita tax
revenue of the center, we get a positive relationship between them (Figure 2.7). This
result is expected because they are both increasing in income.
We next examine tax revenue relationship with income distribution indicators.
Negative relationships are observed both between Bot20pci/GDPpci and rTAXcpci and
Bot20pci/GDPpci and rTAXmpci (Figures 2.8-2.9). However, there is no relationship
between rTAXmpci and Top20pci/GDPpc (Figure 2.11). We see a slightly positive
relationship between rTAXcpci and Top20pci/GDPpc (Figure 2.10). We expect positive
relationships between these variables because when people become richer, they should
give more tax to both central and local governments. Our results are against expectations
because while Bot20 income is increasing, the amount of tax that they pay decrease. In
addition, we do not see the strongly expected positive relationship in Top20 income case.
This shows that in Turkey, the wealth you have and the tax amount you pay are not
correlated properly.
3.3 Measures of Decentralization
We define the ratios of expenditure of municipalities to expenditures of center
(EXPm/EXPc) and tax revenue of municipalities to central tax revenue (TAXm/TAXc)
as the measures of decentralization. When we look at the expenditures separately, we see
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that rEXPcpc is negatively related with rGDPpc and rEXPmpc is positively related with
rGDPpc (Figures 1.1-1.2). Then, we observe that the expenditure ratio is positively
related with rGDPpc (Figure 3.1). This result is intuitive due to the observations made on
the preceding sentences. rEXPmpc is positively related with the number of taxpayers
(NuTAXp) but rEXPcpc and NuTAXp relationship is slightly negative (Figure 1.9-1.10).
The ratio of expenditures is positively related with the number of taxpayers (Figure 3.2).
This result is also intuitive as a result of individual relationships between expenditures
and NuTAXp. This is an indicator of municipalities being more responsive for the local
needs and demands than the central government.
If we examine the tax revenue side, we see a negative relationship between
TAXm/TAXc and both rGDPpc and NuTAXp (Figures 3.3-3.4). Tax revenue increases in
both rGDPpc and NuTAXp and for both government levels (Figures 2.1-2.2-2.3-2.4).
However, negative relationship in tax ratio tells us that tax revenue of municipalities
increase in both rGDPpc and NuTAXp less than that of center. Thus, municipalities
appears to have little ability or capacity of collecting taxes, or, generally, collecting own
revenue. This is an important result about the efficiency of local governments while they
are performing their budgetary practices. This result intuitively shows that
decentralization had not been realized to a great extent in Turkey.
3.4 Volatility Measures
Another kind of variable that is important for fiscal policy and its efficiency is the
volatility or variability of our variables. How central government has reacted to shocks
occurring in the economy shows the responsiveness of the government to these shocks.
Volatility in rGDPpc (STDrGDPpc) and in rGDPpc growth rate (STDrgrGDPpc) are our
main variables with which we can observe the shocks or changes in economic
environment. In our analysis, when we plot volatility in real per capita growth rate of
central expenditures (STDrgrEXPcpc) versus STDrgrGDPpc, we do not see a
relationship (Figure 4.1). The relationships of volatility variables with real tax revenue
and real expenditures of central government are also ambiguous (Figures 4.2-4.3-4.4).
Thus, we can say that the volatility in expenditures of central government is not
associated with the volatility of the underlying macroeconomic environment.
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3.5 Government Size
Government size is generally defined as total government expenditure in
percentage of GDP in public finance literature. Similarly, we define a subset of total
government expenditures, which is personal expenditure, as an indicator of government
size. In our study, we try to investigate whether there is a correlation between real per
capita personnel expenditure (rPersEXPcpc) and real per capita tax revenue; rGDPpc;
and the ratio of real tax revenue to number of taxpayers (rTAXc/NuTAXp). We find a
slightly positive correlation between rPersEXPcpc and rTAXc/NuTAXp (Figure 5.1).
This result is intuitive in the sense that in provinces where the state’s real per capita
personnel spending is higher, tax collection appears more efficient. However, this
causality may be interpreted also like that more tax revenue per tax payer may also result
more employment opportunities. There does not appear to be any relationship between
rPersEXPcpc and real per capita tax revenues of central and local governments (Figures
5.2-5.3). This says nothing about tax collection efficiency. However, we observe a
negative correlation between rPersEXPcpc and rGDPpc (Figure 5.4). Thus, it is possible
to say that in the richer areas, the government size tend to be smaller than poorer ones.
3.6 Investment Spending
As a breakdown of spending, we examine the public investment expenditure and
private sector investment incentives (PubInvExp and PrivInvInc). The most important
efficiency indicator under this topic is the number of employed people as a result of these
investments (EMPpub and EMPprvt). According to our data, the relationship between
real aggregate private investment expenditures and the resulting number of employed
people is positive as expected and this indicates efficiency in private investments
incentives (Figure 6.1). However, in the case of public investment expenditures, there is
no correlation (Figure 6.2). When we plot the same graph with per capita investments, we
get the same results (Figures 6.3-6.4). We next try to connect both real per capita
investment expenditures with rGDPpc. In this case, we do not observe significant
correlations between them except the positive relationship between rGDPpc and
rPrivInvIncpc (Figures 6.5-6.6 and Figures 6.7-6.8). This positive relationship indicates
that private incentives are higher in richer areas. We next check whether there is a
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relationship between real per capita investment expenditures and Bot20pc and Top20pc.
We get no significant relationships among them (Figures 6.9-6.10 and Figures 6.11-6.12).
Thus, only the number of employed people as a result of private investment incentives
appears significant for our analysis. Then, we may conclude that private sector
investment incentives are more efficient than public investment expenditures.
3.7 Social Indicators
Lastly, we examine the connection between some crucial social indicators and our
other budgetary variables. We have two different social indicators, which are the number
of students per teacher (SPTeacher) and the number of people per doctor (PPDoctor). The
education index does not vary much across provinces. However, a slight negative
relationship with rGDPpc shows that people in richer areas have better education
opportunities across the provinces (Figure 7.1). There is no significant correlation
between education index and real per capita expenditures of central government (Figure
7.3. However, we have a slightly negative relationship education and municipal
expenditures (Figure 7.2).  For both of the income distribution variables, there is no
correlation with Top20/Bot20 (Figure 7.4), Bot20pci/GDPpci (Figure 7.5) and
Top20pci/GDPpc (Figure 7.6). There is a slight decrease in it, however, with the increase
in Bot20pc (Figure 7.7) and Bot20pc/GDPpc (Figure 7.8) variables. These observations
indicate that the government’s education spending is rather even across the provinces of
country.
With health indicator, on the other hand, we observe strong relationships. Firstly,
it decreases with the increase of rGDPpc (Figure 7.9). When we plot PPDoctor versus
rEXPmpc and rEXPcpc, we observe negative relationships between them (Figures 7.10-
7.11). PPDoctor is decreasing with almost all income distribution variables (Figures 7.12-
7.13-7.14) except Bot20pci/GDPpci (Figure 7.15). As a result, the findings can be
interpreted as people who are wealthier than others have better health opportunities
across the provinces of the country. Thus, we may conclude that public spending on
health may not be accommodative of all income groups in an even way.
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Chapter 4
Methodology and Regression Analysis
4.1 Methodology
In this chapter, we empirically analyze the determinants of variables related to
budgetary efficiency in Turkish provinces. In order to do this, we regress these budgetary
variables on some other explanatory variables. Our basic variables are municipal and
central expenditure, tax revenues, GDP, education and health indicators. However, by
using these basic variables, we obtain different set of variables, such as expenditure and
tax ratios, volatility in GDP and in central expenditure. Thus, we have about 20 variables
together with the mentioned ones generated from the basic variables. Table 4 in
Appendix 2 includes all data that we use in regression analysis.
Initially, we intended to do a panel data analysis but due to the difficulties in
obtaining some of the data for the last decade, we use only a cross-sectional analysis in
the current study. As we have time-series data for some of the variables, we used yearly
average of these data in the regression analysis1.
----------------------------------------------------------
1 for example, we have real per capita central expenditure data of each province for 10 years but in
our data set, we take the average of these 10 years data and then use it.
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In order to be able to interpret the results, we use real and per capita values for our
data. In addition to this, in order to avoid the scale problems in our regression analysis,
all variables are converted into logarithmic scale except those appearing in ratios such as
decentralization measures and income ratios of top and bottom. In our regression
analysis, we also use two different dummies, which are OHAL (Emergency State
Regions) and KOY (Priority Regions for development), as control variables. Moreover,
all regressions are white-heteroscedasticity consistent and robust.
An important note is that income distribution variables are available only for 19
of the 81 provinces in our regressions. Hence, this obviously poses a problem of the loss
of degrees of freedom. Table 1.b and 2.b in Appendix 2 present the results of our
regressions conducted by adding the income distribution variables to the variables in
Table 1.a and 2.a. Because of lack of degrees of freedom, the results obtained from these
regressions are not comparable with the ones obtained without using income distribution
variables. Also, we observe that different data sources give different data for the same
variables and for the same years1. In addition, there appear measurement problems with
some data2.
4.2 Regression Analysis
4.2.1 Central and Municipal Expenditures
In order to understand the multivariate relationships among central and municipal
expenditures and other variables, we make regression analysis. These regressions are
reported in the first three columns of Table 1.a and 1.b. When we regress central
expenditure on rGDPpc, Vaagr, Taxc and income distribution variable, we observe
significant results. The relationship between Expc and rGDPpc is negative and significant
as observed in the graphical analysis. This result indicates expenditure efficiency in the
sense that central government expenditure is high in lower GDP regions. However, the
causality may also be vice versa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 for example, State Planning Organization and General Directorate of Public Accounts give
different values for investment expenditures. We use the first ones’ data because it gives the breakdowns of
the investment expenditures as public and private.
2 for example, agricultural production is higher than total production in Ağrı, Muş, Ardahan.
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Positive correlation between agricultural production and central expenditure may
be interpreted as there is expenditure compensation to the regions whose agricultural
production is high. In addition, the dependence of central expenditures to central tax
collection can be recognized easily. In the regression of central expenditures on
municipal expenditures, the relationship between these two variables is significant and
positive. We also observe similar relationship in the graphical analysis. In countries,
which are decentralized in terms of expenditure, this relation is negative but in Turkey,
we do not see any negative relationship. In addition, we used two different dummy
variables which are OHAL (D1, Emergency State Regions) and KOY (D2, Priority
Regions for Development). In central expenditure case, OHAL’s and KOY’s coefficients
are positive and significant indicating more expenditure for OHAL and KOY as expected
(Table 1.a).
We then regress EXPm on rGDPpc, Vaagr, Taxm and the D1 and D2. We find
positive but not significant relationship between EXPm and rGDPpc as in the graphical
analysis. The coefficient of VAagr is positive and significant, which implies that when
agricultural production increase, then municipal expenditure also increase and this also
can be interpreted as an expenditure compensation policy of municipalities to agricultural
regions. The correlation of EXPm with TAXm is significant and positive. D1 has a
positive but not a significant coefficient. D2 has a negative but not significant coefficient
in the EXPm regression analysis. This shows that central government make more
expenditure for OHAL and KOY than municipalities do.
When we add the income distribution variable, Top20/Bot20, to our analysis, we
see positive correlation for both central and municipal expenditures (Table 1.b).
However, income distribution variable is not significant in both cases. Moreover, the
goodness of fit remarkably decreases in the central expenditure case with the addition of
income distribution variable. The positive relationship can be interpreted as when income
distribution becomes worse, municipality expenditure increases.
Although we would have liked to make an analysis of whether local governments
are self-financing or not, we cannot find the necessary own revenue data of
municipalities. This analysis would have also provided useful information about
decentralization.
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4.2.2. Central and Municipal Tax Revenues
We next look at the real per capita tax revenues of central and municipal
governments (fourth and fifth columns of Table 1.a and 2.a). The coefficients of rGDPpc
in our regression analysis are both positive, as expected, and significant as in the graphs.
The correlation between central tax revenue and municipal tax revenue is negative and
significant. We find this relationship positive in graphical analysis and we say that this
positive relation is expected because of increasing of both of them with income. The
negative relationship in our regression can be interpreted in terms of decentralization that
there is a transfer of some discretions of tax revenue collection between different levels
of the government. But, we do not know the direction of this discretion transfer.
However, we did not see any expenditure side decentralization in the expenditure
analysis in previous section. We observe negative and significant relationships of both
TAXc and TAXm with VAagr. This may be interpreted as a kind of ‘incentive’ for
agricultural regions by collecting lesser tax. The significant dependence of tax collection
and expenditure is also observed in these regressions. We get negative and significant
coefficients for central tax collection but not for municipal tax collection for dummy
variables. This indicates that, central government makes less tax collection from OHAL
and KOY than municipalities, which can be understood as a compensation for these
provinces.
When we add income distribution variable, TOP20/BOT20, to our analysis, we
observe that it does not have a significant effect on both tax revenues. It is positive but
not significant. Thus, we can say that income distribution is not an effective variable for
tax collection.
4.2.3 Measures of Decentralization
We analyze the expenditure ratio, EXPm/EXPc as one of the decentralization
measures. Except rGDPpc, other variables are almost not related with expenditure and tax
ratios significantly. We see a positive correlation of expenditure ratio with rGDPpc as in
the graphical analysis. When we look at the relationships between rGDPpc and
expenditure variables separately, we see positive correlation with municipality and
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negative correlation with central expenditures. Then, we can say that the positive
correlation in expenditure ratio case is expected from these individual relationships.
Similarly, the separate relationships of rGDPpc with central and municipal tax
revenue variables are positive. On the other hand, the tax ratio, TAXm/TAXc, and
rGDPpc are negatively and significantly correlated with each other as in the graphical
analysis. Then, we can say that this negative relationship indicates that the municipality
tax collection increase in GDP less than that of center. Thus, as indicated in graphical
analysis, this relationship says that revenue decentralization had not been realized to a
great extent in Turkey.
4.2.4 Volatility Measures
We next examine the volatility variables that are important for the fiscal policy
(Table 3). These variables help us to understand central governments’ response to the
shocks in the macroeconomic environment. We further explore this issue, which does not
appear in the graphical analysis. Firstly, we regress volatility in rGDPpc (VOLGDP) on
Vaagr; volatility in central expenditure (VOLExpc); our decentralization measures and
dummies. Only VAagr and VOLExpc are significantly related with VOLGDP and their
coefficients are negative. We rather expected to get a positive relationship between
volatilities of GDP and central expenditure in terms of a way of thinking that when the
volatility in GDP increases (or decreases), government, as a policy maker, adjust these
movements in GDP by using the expenditure instrument properly. Expenditure ratio is
positively and tax ratio is negatively related to VOLGDP but both are insignificant. The
dummy variables’ coefficients are positive but not significant.
Secondly, when we regress volatility in central expenditure on VAagr and
dummies, we recognize a negative and significant correlation between VAagr and
VOLEXPc. We cannot say a certain thing about this relationship because we do not have
time series data of VAagr and so the volatility in VAagr. The D2 is negatively and
significantly related with expenditure volatility. This result may be interpreted such that
the amount of expenditure for priority regions does not change drastically over time.
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4.2.5 Investment Spending
When we analyze the public investment expenditures and private investment
incentives, we observe a significant relationship only between PrivInvInc and rGDPpc as
in our graphical analysis (Table 2.a). This correlation is positive and indicates that private
incentives are higher in richer areas. However, when we add income distribution
variables, namely TOP20pc/rGDPpc and BOT20pc/rGDPpci, a reverse relationship is
observed, which is negative and insignificant, and BOT20pci/rGDPpci is negatively and
significantly related with PrivInvInc (Table 2.b). In addition, we look at the relationships
of GDP growth (GrGDP) with PrivInvInc, PubInvExp, EXPc, EXPm and dummies. The
only significant correlation is in between PrivInvInc and GrGDP, positively. We also see
this positive relationship in between GDP level and PrivInvInc (Table 3).
In PubInvInc case, we do not observe any significant correlation (Table 2.a).
However, when we add income distribution variables to our analysis, we observe that
GDP is positively and significantly and TOP20pci/rGDPpc is negatively and significantly
related to public investment expenditure (Table 2.b).
4.2.6 Social Indicators
In the regression analysis of social indicators, we almost see the same
relationships that we observe in the graphical analysis, but more strongly. First we
regress our education indicator, student per teacher (SPTeacher), on rGDPpc and central
and municipal expenditures. All of them are negatively related with SPTeacher but only
the coefficient of rGDPpc is significant (Table 2.a). The negative relationships in
expenditure cases can  be interpreted as good indicators of efficiency but they are
insignificant. But this relationship can also be interpreted such that expenditures should
increase where SPTeacher is high and so this result is indicator of inefficiency. These
results do not appear in the graphical analysis. We use also our two dummy variables in
this regression. Only D1 is positive and significant for education indicator case and the
positive correlation is expected. When we add income distribution variable,
BOT20pc/rGDPpci, it does not appear as significant variable and also the significant
correlation of GDP with SPTeacher disappears (Table 2.b).
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We see negative and significant relationships of our health indicator, people per
doctor (PPDoctor), with rGDPpc, central expenditure, municipal expenditure and dummy
variables (Table 2.a). Except the dummy variables whose coefficients are positive, the
other variables have negative and significant relationships with PPDoctor. We observe
these negative relationships also in the graphical analysis. Increasing of health quality
when expenditures increase is an expected result and is a good result in terms of
expenditure efficiency. However, this relationship can be interpreted as a bad result as in
the case of education. The positive relationship of D1 and D2 are expected. After adding
the income distribution variable, it appears as negative and significant, which we also
expect (Table 2.b).
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Chapter 5
Results and Conclusion
Globalization process is under way all over the world. Therefore, the importance
of the role of local governments, which meet the local needs, is also increasing day by
day. There is a general and strong tendency towards decentralization and federalism, the
devolution of authority from central to local levels, in the world. There is limited but
growing literature about fiscal federalism and decentralization. Besides the traditional
theories, the new federalism theories bring contemporary perspectives to these
controversial issues.
The number of empirical and case studies about decentralization has been
growing as many countries try to apply these theoretical approaches to their government
structures. There are not only successful countries like China, but also problematic ones
like Russia and Colombia due to the defective design of decentralization.
In this growing empirical literature, there is no specific study reflecting Turkey’s
recent situation in terms of decentralization. As it is very important to know where
Turkey stands in this framework, to find remedies for existing problems about
government structure and to follow the global tendency toward decentralization in the
world properly, fiscal federalism and decentralization should be studied carefully.
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In this study, we examine expenditure and tax collection efficiency and recent
situation of Turkey in decentralization process by looking at the local-central government
fiscal relationships. We studied a provincial level data set in order to empirically
investigate the basic implications of the traditional theories. We address budgetary
efficiency by examining the bivariate and multivariate relationships among relevant
variables.
The initial focus of the study is on whether there is an attempt to more
decentralized government structure in Turkey. We observe that there has not been a
significant trend toward expenditure decentralization recently. However, we observe a
slight trend toward tax decentralization that is devolution of discretion from central to
local governments in terms of tax collection. But we also recognize that the great portion
of the total taxes collected in a province goes to central government, while municipalities
do not have as much ability to improve their tax revenues as GDP increases as the central
government does.
Besides the fact that Turkey does not have a specific program for expenditure
decentralization, it has even decreased the ratio of local spending out of total government
spending between 1995 and 1998. While this ratio is approximately 35% in industrialized
countries and 12-15% in Latin American countries, the underlying figure is about 11% in
Turkey. According to the Stand-by treaty of Turkey with IMF in year 1999, before it
collapsed, it had foreseen that own-revenues of local governments should be increased
and there should be no grant or transfer except for the existing tax transfers. However,
since it ended, it is unknown what the future of this intention will be.
The revenue decentralization is important as much as expenditure decentralization
as indicated by new federalism theories. The tax revenue is the most important part of the
revenues for all levels of governments. Turkey has big problems with tax collection. The
basic problem is the difference between planned and realized amount of collected tax.
Governments cannot sufficiently succeed in collecting tax. The remedy of this is not
increasing tax rates or bases which Turkey try to do. The remedy should be increasing the
realized amount of tax collection with the existing tax rates and bases. An interesting and
striking example that shows the recent situation of Turkey in tax collection is that
according to a research done by Ministry of Finance, only 37 out of 3100 tax written
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statements of taxpayers given to the inspectors of Ministry is legal in 2000. The others
are not legal and include some deficiencies.
Giving municipalities the discretion to collect all taxes in their own regions while
some part of this collected tax is transferred directly to the municipalities may prevent
this kind of inefficiency. This not only increases the efficiency of tax collection, which
increases the realized amount of tax collection, but also creates an incentive mechanism
for municipalities to increase their own revenues. This method is applied in metropolitan
municipalities and widening it across all municipalities may be useful. This method, of
course, makes municipalities with high GDP more advantageous with respect to the ones
that have lower GDP. This can be prevented by adjusting the amount of tax, which is
transferred to local governments from the central government not only according to the
population size, but also according to the municipalities’ GDP level.
The next major concern of the analysis is the effects of the shocks realized in the
macroeconomic environment, which is GDP volatility, on the government’s actions. We
do not see any significant compensatory policy of the central government against these
shocks. Another result is that private investment incentives given by central government
to private enterprises are higher in richer areas.
Another striking finding is that central expenditures have a compensative role in
the agricultural regions that they increase when agricultural production increase in a
province. Similarly, tax collection lessens in the regions where agricultural production is
dense that can be interpreted as an incentive policy of central government. In addition,
central government applies these policies in priority regions for development and
emergency state regions.
Another point worth mentioning about the results of our inquiry is about the
social indicators, which are important for understanding budgetary efficiency of
governments. In case of health, we observe a significant uneven distribution of the
facilities and inequality among different income groups, which can be prevented by
central and municipal governments by pursuing proper expenditure policies. In case of
education, however, if it is compared with the health case, we see that spending makes
education facilities fairer across provinces than in the case of health.
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Developments with regards to fiscal federalism and decentralization in Turkey,
where Turkey stands in political decentralization framework and what the current
situation of Turkey is in terms of new fiscal federalism theories are striking and
interesting topics for further research.
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APPENDIX 1: Data Source and Descriptions
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We should point out that our study contains several kinds of data provided from
different sources. We also have a lot of produced data such as per capita values, standard
deviations of some variables, growth rates, average values and so on. As we have a huge
data set, we should use some abbreviations. This is important to make life easier. The
following table contains variables, abbreviations, sources and time range for data set.
Number in the provinces column represents the number of provinces whose data is
available for the underlying variable.
VARIABLE ABBREVIATION SOURCE
DATA
RANGE
PROVINCES
GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT
GDP
STATE STATISTICAL
INSTITUTE (DIE)
1990-1997 79
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT TAX
REVENUE
TAXc
GENERAL
DIRECTORATE OF
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
(MUHASEBAT
MUDURLUGU) (MM)
1990-2000 79
CONSOLIDATED
BUDGET REVENUE
OF CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
REVc MM 1990-2000 79
CONSOLIDATED
BUDGET
EXPENDITURE OF
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
EXPc MM 1990-2000 79
CONSOLIDATED
BUDGET EXP. OF
CENTRAL GOV
FOR PERSONNEL
PersEXPc MM 1990-2000 79
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CONSOLIDATED
BUDGET
EXPENDITURE OF
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT FOR
INVESTMENT
InvEXPc MM 1990-2000 79
CONSOLIDATED
BUDGET
EXPENDITURE OF
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT FOR
TRANSFER
TRc MM 1990-2000 79
1995 & 1998 76MUNICIPAL TAX
REVENUE
TAXm DIE
1998 3
1995 & 1998 76
CONSOLIDATED
BUDGET
EXPENDITURE OF
MUNICIPALITIES
EXPm DIE
1998 3
PUBLIC
INVESTMENT
EXPENDITURE
PubInvExp
STATE PLANNING
ORGANISATION (DPT)
1990-1997 79
EMPLOYED
NUMBER OF
PEOPLE AS A
RESULT OF
PubInvExp
EMPpub DPT 1993 65
PRIVATE SECTOR
INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES
PrivInvInc
DPT 1992-1997 79
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EMPLOYED
NUMBER OF
PEOPLE AS A
RESULT OF
PrivInvInc
EMPprvt DPT 1992-1997 80
TOTAL
AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION
VAagr DPT 1996 79
NUMBER OF
TAXPAYERS
NuTAXp DPT 1997 80
TOTAL NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS
#HouseH DIE 1994 19
TOTAL REVENUE
OF TOP % 20
HOUSEHOLDS
Top20 DIE 1994 19
TOTAL REVENUE
OF BOTTOM % 20
HOUSEHOLDS
Bot20 DIE 1994 19
RATIO OF NUMBER
OF STUDENTS TO
NUMBER OF
TEACHERS
SPTeacher DPT 1996 79
NUMBER OF
PEOPLE PER
DOCTOR
PPDoctor DPT 1996 80
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For per capita values of variables, we put ‘pc’ following a variable such as
GDPpc, Top20pc. ‘m’ stands for municipality and ‘c’ stands for center. We used ‘Avg’ in
front of the variables that are shown in averages, such as Avg(EXPc/GDP), which means
the average of consolidated budget expenditure of central government in ratio to GDP.
For the standard deviation of a variable, we put ‘STD’ in front of it such as STDrGDP. If
the variable is in constant price, we use ‘r’, which stands for ‘real’ in front of it, such as
rGDP. For growth rate of a variable, we put ‘gr’ in front of it, such as grrGDPpc, which
means the growth rate of real GDP per capita. The suffix ‘i’ represents that data belongs
to province ‘i’, such as (Bot20pc/GDPpc) i represents the per capita revenue of bottom 20
percent of the households in a specific province, in ratio to per capita GDP in that
province. The expressions D1 and D2 mentioned in the regression analysis stands for
OHAL (Emergency State Regions) and KOY (Priority Regions for Development),
respectively.
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APPENDIX 2: Tables
CORRELATION MATRIX
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EXPRATIO 1
TAXRATIO -0,5 1
RGDPPC 0,746 -0,8 1
RTAXCPC 0,678 -0,83 0,906 1
RTAXMPC 0,638 -0,63 0,819 0,913 1
REXPCPC -0,44 0,044 -0 0,176 0,234 1
REXPMPC 0,685 -0,61 0,852 0,916 0,966 0,251 1
RPUBINVEXPPC 0,183 -0,39 0,504 0,54 0,369 0,367 0,488 147 RPRIVINVEXPPC 0,523 -0,5 0,6 0,425 0,399 -0,35 0,397 0,194 1
RVAAGRPC -0,24 0,322 -0,3 -0,49 -0,53 -0,09 -0,42 -0,15 -0,16 1
BOT20PC 0,144 -0,55 0,553 0,543 0,679 0,329 0,563 0,147 0,435 -0,43 1
TOP20PC 0,149 -0,5 0,476 0,511 0,662 0,362 0,536 -0 0,308 -0,41 0,953 1
BOT20PERGDPPC -0,7 0,59 -0,84 -0,67 -0,66 0,198 -0,7 -0,39 -0,72 0,09 -0,38 -0,27 1
TOP20PERGDPPC 0,061 -0,34 0,143 0,35 0,346 0,33 0,289 -0,13 -0,27 -0,37 0,368 0,582 0,208 1
TOP20PERBOT20 0,072 2E-04 -0,09 0,066 0,145 0,2 0,092 -0,43 -0,29 -0,08 0,124 0,415 0,239 0,833 1
PPDOCTOR 0,12 0,469 -0,37 -0,49 -0,52 -0,7 -0,48 -0,26 0,01 0,335 -0,73 -0,76 0,041 -0,62 -0,3 1
SPTEACHER 0,057 0,29 -0,2 -0,12 0,024 -0,15 -0,08 -0,24 0,042 -0,48 -0,06 -0,03 -0,01 -0,13 0,047 0,367 1
RGRGDPPC 0,687 -0,73 0,773 0,638 0,572 -0,33 0,579 0,165 0,728 -0,27 0,491 0,465 -0,7 0,232 0,092 -0,22 -0,15 1
NUTAXP 0,473 -0,53 0,648 0,646 0,797 0,081 0,732 0,073 0,291 -0,55 0,786 0,761 -0,44 0,435 0,159 -0,6 -0,04 0,561 1
RPERSEXPPC -0,46 0,16 -0,09 0,038 0,026 0,904 0,073 0,392 -0,39 0,134 0,056 0,109 0,201 0,17 0,182 -0,46 -0,17 -0,38 -0,25 1
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998
Tax Revenue 53,6 60,7 58,3 69 67,5 50,6 55,8 54,9
   Central Tax 40,4 51 45,3 56,7 57,3 44,2 44,9 44,1
   Local Taxes 13,2 9,9 13,1 12,3 10,2 6,4 10,9 10,8
Nontax Reveu 38,4 32,2 24,5 15,7 16,8 22,8 28,5 25,4
Borrowings 7,9 7,1 17,2 15,3 15,7 26,7 15,8 19,7
   In 7,9 5,5 13 7,8 7,9 12,6 11,1 12,5
   Out 0 1,6 4,2 7,5 7,8 14,1 4,6 7,1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: DPT
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998
Current Expe 62 52,3 39 49,3 51,4 48,8 38,2 38
   Personal 44,1 33 22,3 31,2 38,6 38,6 26,7 25,3
Investment E 25 30,9 41,2 18,9 15,5 22,7 20,1 27,2
Transfers 13 16,8 19,8 31,8 33,1 28,5 41,7 34,8
   Borrowings 6,2 5,4 6,5 17 22 13,4 24,6 19,6
      In 6,2 5,2 6 14,9 15,9 7,7 14,8 8
          Base 5,6 5 5,7 13,7 13,6 4,9 9,5 5,3
          Interest 0,6 0,2 0,3 1,2 2,3 2,8 5,3 2,7
      Out 0 0,2 0,5 2,2 6,2 5,7 9,9 11,6
          Base 0 0,2 0,4 1,5 4,8 3,9 6,3 9,6
          Interest 0 0 0,1 0,7 1,4 1,8 3,6 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: DPT
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Table B: Municipality Revenues, as percentage.
Table C: Municipality Expenditures, as percentage.
Dependent 
Variables ---> EXPm TAXc TAXm EXPm/EXPc TAXm/TAXc
( I ) ( II )
GDP -0,37 - 0,02 0,75 0,12 0,21 -0,22
[-4.11]***  [0.49]    [8.38]***    [2.1]**    [3.19]***   [-1.7]*
VAagr 0,16 - 0,07 -0,46 -0,13 -0,11 0,1
[2.78]***    [2.61]**   [-5.34]***   [-4.59]***   [-2.1]** [1.48]
EXPm - 0,3 - 0,92 0,89 - -
  [3.13]***  [2.19]**    [14.1]***
EXPc - - - 0,56 0,05 - -
   [5.22]*** [1.08]
TAXc 0,47 - - - -0,08 - -
   [4.6]***   [-1.85]*
TAXm - - 0,98 -0,67 - - -
   [16.7]***   [-1.81]*
D1 0,29 0,3 0,01 -0,18 -0,02 -0,07 0,01
   [5.85]***   [4.62]*** [0.62]  [-1.9]* [-0.72]    [-3.63]*** [0.12]
D2 0,11 0,07 -0,03 -0,17 0,004 -0,07 0,15
[2.47]**   [1.74]**  [-1.64]   [-4.01]*** [0.25]    [-2.85]***    [2.54]**
Constant 4,43 4,23 -0,2 -0,82 0,6 -0,27 0,91
   [6.89]***   [8.43]***  [-0.57] [-0.92]  [1.71]* [-0.63] [0.86]
Ad. R2 0,42 0,28 0,93 0,84 0,93 0,44 0,28
Number of Obs. 79 78 78 78 78 79 79
1) *, **, *** represent % 10, % 5 and % 1 significance levels, respectively.
2) All variables are real and in per capita terms. They are all in log terms except decentralization measures
and dummy variables. 
3) t-statistics are given in brackets.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix1.
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~~Decentralization Measures~~
EXPc
TABLE 1.a
Dependent 
Variables ---> EXPm TAXc TAXm EXPm/EXPc TAXm/TAXc
( I ) ( II )
GDP -1,29 - 0,27 1,24 -0,12 0,83 -0,53
[-1.5]    [2.66]**   [3.18]** [-0.78]    [3.22]***    [-4.59]***
VAagr 0,15 - 0,1 -0,19 -0,12 0,02 0,05
[1.37] [1.99]** [-1.74]   [-2.99]** [0.24] [1.33]
EXPm - 0,27 - 0,86 0,88 - -
[1.13] [1.27]    [3.77]***
EXPc - - - 0,25 0,005 - -
[1.49] [0.05]
TAXc 0,66 - - - -0,002 - -
[1.56] [-0.01]
TAXm - - 0,97 -0,01 - - -
[6.87]*** [-0.01]
TOP20/BOT20 0,11 0,45 0,04 0,05 0,03 0,36 0,06
[0.19] [0.86]  [0.27] [0.22] [0.21] [0.98] [0.3]
D1 0,37 0,14 0,05 -0,44 -0,04 -0,04 0,36
  [1.82] [0.66] [2.98]**    [-4.09]*** [-0.61] [-0.84]    [5.74]***
D2 -0,05 0,06 0,07 0,09 -0,07 0,06 0,02
[-0.29] [0.48] [2.28]** [0.67] [-1.72] [0.66] [0.2]
Constant 9,02 4,1 -1,9 -6,69 1,81 -5,25 3,12
  [2.79]**   [3.14]*** [-2.62]**    [-3.27]*** [1.66]   [-2.43]**    [3.62]***
Ad. R2 0,06 -0,08 0,96 0,93 0,96 0,42 0,83
Number of Obs. 19 18 18 18 18 19 19
1) *, **, *** represent % 10, % 5 and % 1 significance levels, respectively.
2) All variables are real and in per capita terms. They are all in log terms except decentralization measures,
dummy variables and income distribution variable. 
3) t-statistics are given in brackets.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix1.
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TABLE 1.b
~~Decentralization Measures~~
EXPc
Dependent 
Variables --->   PubInvExp         PrivInvInc GDP PPDoctor SPTeacher
GDP 0,31 1,37 - -0,24 -0,11
[1.26]    [6.3]***    [-4.19]***    [-2.19]**
VAagr 0,06 -0,04 - - -
[0.41] [-0.25]
EXPm - - 0,57 -0,22 -0,04
   [6.41]***   [-2.2]** [-0.44]
EXPc - - -0,06 -0,72 -0,08
[-0.5]    [-11.57]*** [-1.60]
PubInvExp    - - -0,03 - -
[-0.46]
PrivInvInc - - 0,18 - -
   [4.59]***
D1 0,1 -0,28 -0,07 0,28 0,12
[0.68] [-1.53] [-1]    [4.70]***    [3.26]***
D2 0,08 -0,05 -0,08 0,09 -0,02
[0.8] [-0.42]  [-1.74]*    [0.09]*** [-0.97]
Constant 2,65 -2,46 2,67 9,84 2,69
1,56 [-1.23]    [4.32]***    [18.22]***    [6.9]***
Ad. R2 -0,02 0,48 0,69 0,78 0,16
Number of Obs. 79 79 78 78 78
1) *, **, *** represent % 10, % 5 and % 1 significance levels, respectively.
2) All variables are real and in per capita terms. They are all in log terms except EXPm/EXPc. 
3) t-statistics are given in brackets.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix1.
51
TABLE 2.a
~~~Social Indicators~~~
Dependent 
Variables --->    PubInvExp      PrivInvInc PPDoctor SPTeacher
GDP 1,39 -0,009 -0,8 -0,52
   [2.44]** [-0.01]   [-2.11]* [-1.68]
VAagr -0,02 -0,26 - -
[-0.07] [-1.11]
EXPm - - -0,04 0,23
[-0.19] [0.97]
EXPc - - -0,65 -0,1
    [-4.39]*** [-0.66]
TOP20/GDP -0,77 -0,69 - -
 [-1.92]* [-0.93]
BOT20/GDPi 0,5 -0,95 -0,32 -0,14
[1.63]  [-1.92]*   [-1.89]* [-0.88]
Constant -3,25 8,76 12,26 4,03
[-0.68] [1.38]    [5.56]***  [2.27]**
Ad. R2 0,25 0,42 0,61 -0,05
Number of Obs. 19 19 18 18
1) *, **, *** represent % 10, % 5 and % 1 significance levels, respectively.
2) All variables are real and in per capita terms. They are all in log terms except income distribution variables. 
3) t-statistics are given in brackets.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix1.
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TABLE 2.b
Dependent 
Variables ---> VOLGDP VOLEXPc GrGDP
VAagr -0,05 -0,92 -
   [-2.24]**       [-5.57]***
VOLEXPc -0,03 - -
   [-2.44]**
EXPm/EXPc 0,01 - -
[0.4]
TAXm/TAXc -0,04 - -
[-1.55]
PrivInvInc - - 0,02
   [2.57]**
PubInvExp - - -0,002
[-0.18]
EXPm - - -0,03
[-1.39]
EXPc - - -0,025
[-1.3]
D1 0,02 0,08 0,028
[1.48] [0.55] [1.25]
D2 0,01 -0,26 -0,01
[1.13]    [-3.5]*** [-0.97]
Constant 0,71 16,7 0,24
   [2.98]***     [15.93]***   [1.98]**
Ad. R2 0,1 0,33 0,12
Number of Obs. 76 79 74
1) *, **, *** represent % 10, % 5 and % 1 significance levels, respectively.
2) All variables are real and in per capita terms. EXPm, EXPc,Vaagr, PrivInvInc and PubInvExp variables are in log terms. 
3) t-statistics are given in brackets.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix1.
53
TABLE 3
EXPm/EXPc EXPm/EXPc TAXm/TAXc TAXm/TAXc rGDPpc rTAXcpc rTAXmpc rEXPcpc
EXPm,i / EXPc,i 
(1995)
EXPm,i / 
EXPc,i (1998)
TAXm,i / TAXc,i 
(1995)
TAXm,i / TAXc,i 
(1998)
AVERAGE OF 
REAL GDP PER 
CAPITA AT 1987 
PRICES IN TL
AVERAGE OF 
PER CAPITA 
REALTAX 
REVENUE OF 
CENTER IN TL
AVERAGE OF PER 
CAPITA REALTAX 
REVENUE OF 
MUNICIPALITIES IN 
TL
AVERAGE OF REAL 
PER CAPITA BUDGET 
EXPENDITURE OF 
CENTER IN TL
1   Adana 0,31 0,42 0,19 0,19 1599863 707804 134796 815688
2   Adıyaman 0,22 0,19 0,31 0,48 939378 118931 43571 413804
3   Afyon 0,36 0,41 0,36 0,41 872233 203364 74784 439066
4   Ağrı 0,08 0,09 0,28 0,22 295534 114473 26881** 532427
5   Amasya 0,24 0,22 0,21 0,33 954583 257049 70746 759267
6   Ankara 0,32 0,14 0,09 0,08 2145911 2462807 216767 2382433
7   Antalya 0,32 0,40 0,18 0,20 1788645 495442 91483 664746
8   Artvin 0,16 0,11 0,17 0,14 1876829 375492 51364 910620
9   Aydın 0,36 0,23 0,19 0,19 1712003 390284 72906 627388
10   Balıkesir 0,17 0,19 0,10 0,14 1548492 523024 62372 744418
11   Bilecik 0,22 0,19 0,14 0,16 2591309 479760 71478 654357
12   Bingöl 0,07 0,07 0,36 0,52 371966 87300 35375 937851
13   Bitlis 0,10 0,15 0,47 0,94 408455 80546 48080 674568
14   Bolu 0,24 0,22 0,14 0,17 1606726 357385 58043 544292
15   Burdur 0,23 0,23 0,24 0,24 1323620 303737 71660 637731
16   Bursa 0,32 0,55 0,10 0,13 2159482 1101644 126168 699597
17   Çanakkale 0,18 0,19 0,17 0,17 2064516 400940 66138 794765
18   Çankırı 0,25 0,25 0,45 0,45 770804 160080 66170 599166
19   Çorum 0,37 0,26 0,30 0,33 1161718 191168 60828 442597
20   Denizli 0,28 0,30 0,14 0,18 1677253 452272 75589 524387
21   Diyarbakır 0,19 0,17 0,56 0,68 990233 138102 71113 1088014
22   Edirne 0,12 0,14 0,07 0,11 1362691 717166 70285 1070945
23   Elazığ 0,09 0,09 0,26 0,23 1228273 284909 61384 1458517
24   Erzincan 0,25 0,26 0,71 0,76 772793 178361 126733 804557
25   Erzurum 0,11 0,14 0,28 0,54 621198 196510 71916 1206968
26   Eskişehir 0,15 0,14 0,13 0,16 1660924 715892 106828 1331045
27   Gaziantep 0,43 0,36 0,27 0,29 1286305 323061 91402 427368
28   Giresun 0,23 0,20 0,22 0,29 837562 247527 55169 512818
29 Gumushane 0,33 0,27 0.98*** 0,95 624840 114716 104544 611144
30   Hakkari 0.053** 0,05 0,48 0,38 283198** 126153 39259 1402396
31   Hatay 0,34 0,25 0,15 0,17 1360897 487502 74769 455653
32   Isparta 0,23 0,24 0,21 0,29 1007956 341166 80300 937328
33   İçel 0,52 0,44 0,12 0,22 1856162 698350 110910 503924
34   İstanbul 0,58 0,55 0,09 0,09 2443562 2842880 264565*** 768078
35   İzmir 0,36 0,42 0,09 0,12 2535809 1553617 172505 976711
36   Kars 0,08 0,08 0,31 0,36 475172 135139 38656 872617
37 Kastamonu 0,08 0,09 0,16 0,19 1098698 314081 52974 1206491
38   Kayseri na 0,29 na 0,24 1090981 463956 na 942552
39   Kırklareli 0,18 0,25 0,10 0,11 2515980 678113 69787 698640
40   Kırşehir 0,28 0,29 0,31 0,35 965637 221594 66803 525084
41   Kocaeli 0.670*** 0.815*** 0.03** 0.03** 4064542*** 7500980*** 230216 856194
42   Konya 0,28 0,40 0,31 0,39 1140874 299565 94426 605647
43   Kütahya 0,36 0,28 0,11 0,18 1342992 432487 56399 446370
44   Malatya 0,14 0,17 0,25 0,31 1123714 207810 52100 788428
45   Manisa 0,35 0,32 0,18 0,18 2068415 399949 72400 415147
46   K.Maraş 0,25 0,21 0,25 0,29 990784 194150 53238 446976
47   Mardin 0,23 0,18 0,76 0,53 681181 109685 57784 624831
48   Muğla 0,36 0,32 0,16 0,17 2151837 547727 90094 581527
49   Muş 0,14 0,13 0,63 0,63 363401 64805** 35534 522141
50   Nevşehir 0,47 0,40 0,34 0,38 1736203 233541 79022 488630
51   Niğde 0,31 0,26 0,26 0,33 1209477 262126 77468 607951
52   Ordu 0,40 0,35 0,37 0,39 742836 180039 70908 351392**
53   Rize 0,32 0,23 0,14 0,13 1316230 473700 56790 524270
54   Sakarya 0,36 0,28 0,20 0,25 1396955 338753 79676 562853
55   Samsun 0,17 0,16 0,17 0,21 1227588 423505 71857 876572
56   Siirt 0,09 0,08 0,50 0,62 696136 94588 46663 997053
57   Sinop 0,22 0,19 0,33 0,32 903682 205871 62578 672015
58   Sivas 0,15 0,15 0,26 0,27 841438 223078 57278 872630
59   Tekirdağ 0,18 0,30 0,08 0,10 2078740 850124 75384 655889
60   Tokat 0,36 0,32 0,46 0,50 926556 152353 69939 439104
61   Trabzon 0,13 0,14 0,18 0,26 1022333 317909 61214 976728
62   Tunceli 0,11 0,08 0,77 0,61 608363 194857 128619 2238035***
63   Urfa 0,20 0,20 0,58 0,37 705363 108464 45187 457619
64   Uşak 0,28 0,29 0,18 0,19 1155073 313860 57516 486627
65   Van 0,07 0,07 0,31 0,31 496082 143997 37052 1033536
66   Yozgat 0,32 0,26 0,40 0,35 685211 139880 46355 385926
67   Zonguldak 0,60 0,35 0,12 0,12 1345374 898754 97769 544691
68   Aksaray 0,46 0,29 0,48 0,27 729317 182063 61064 369818
69   Bayburt 0,17 0,22 0,42 0,64 729317 104742 56717 615916
70   Karaman 0,38 0,34 0,33 0,37 1635937 214728 71510 436663
71   Kırıkkale 0,31 0,31 0,24 0,22 1638423 438861 92114 507885
72   Batman 0,15 0,12 0,28 0,38 940574 153635 37964 521295
73   Şırnak 0,05 0.05** 0,56 0,20 332998 120926 33471 1103240
74   Bartın 0,19 0,13 0,22 0,17 658462 249031 45427 525349
75   Ardahan 0,09 0,09 0,39 0,24 428477 154467 34525 774387
76   Iğdır 0,12 0,06 0,42 0,21 494829 154402 36582 728713
77   Yalova na 0,34 na 0,16 3369140 523086 100732 454239
78   Karabük na 0,27 na 0,32 3101127 419810 127152 532633
79   Kilis na 0,20 na 1.23*** 1470355 125711 96246 513434
80   Osmaniye na na na na 1010922 112369 na 378008
81   Düzce na na na na na na na na
Average 0,13 0,11 0,11 0,11 1585302 1049253 118150 1802332
Note: **, *** represent minimum and maximum of the column, respectively.
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TABLE 4
rEXPmpc rPubInvExppc rPrivInvExppc rVaagrpc BOT20pc TOP20pc TOP20pc/GDPpc
AVERAGE OF REAL 
PER CAPITA 
BUDGET 
EXPENDITURE OF 
MUNICIPALITIES IN 
TL
AVERAGE OF 
REAL PER CAPITA 
PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT 
EXPENDITURE IN 
TL 
AVERAGE OF REAL 
PER CAPITA PRIVATE 
SECTOR INVESTMENT 
INCENTIVES IN TL
AVERAGE OF REAL 
PER CAPITA 
AGRICULTURAL 
VALUE ADDED IN TL 
PER CAPITA 
TOTAL REVENUE 
OF BOTTOM % 20  
PER MONTH IN TL 
PER CAPITA TOTAL 
REVENUE OF TOP 
% 20  PER MONTH 
IN TL 
TOP20pc / GDPpc 
in Turkey
1   Adana 252344 72121 1171562 2375373 103812 1146126 7,60
2   Adıyaman 67636 43203 322875 1508277 na na na
3   Afyon 155560 39660 147585 2660057 na na na
4   Ağrı 44788** 35687 22882** 1646842 na na na
5   Amasya 159524 39465 220937 2907266 na na na
6   Ankara 450980 240248 767602 806976 210821 1251431 6,20
7   Antalya 200737 113801 786789 2470965 82080 548652 5,70
8   Artvin 105071 97487 94442 2068938 na na na
9   Aydın 153463 53274 426094 3573842 na na na
10   Balıkesir 121048 96293 359385 4314493 na na na
11   Bilecik 124525 92091 2965439 3100118 na na na
12   Bingöl 68128 530753*** 108022 1792095 na na na
13   Bitlis 77022 25777 34834 1494879 na na na
14   Bolu 121174 64456 694327 3147471 na na na
15   Burdur 129240 47643 190931 3448213 na na na
16   Bursa 274449 163423 2966903 2017128 108442 749775 5,20
17   Çanakkale 135427 117247 617171 4700926*** na na na
18   Çankırı 139182 51835 1688228 2773089 na na na
19   Çorum 126329 84515 300539 2444782 na na na
20   Denizli 144371 71356 2055948 2244558 64074 461586 5,60
21   Diyarbakır 159606 141874 359961 1792305 36691** 223500** 3,40
22   Edirne 129925 143822 716223 3345113 na na na
23   Elazığ 108473 102294 216084 1450347 na na na
24   Erzincan 180539 275449 199782 2781902 na na na
25   Erzurum 127736 80519 91801 1708821 42893 411114 7,20
26   Eskişehir 168789 154781 1071287 1916269 132800 934011 4,80
27   Gaziantep 147026 64797 3282108 1039549 74591 391218 2.9**
28   Giresun 99728 16513 59165 1618550 na na na
29 Gumushane 156308 146233 170873 2074955 na na na
30   Hakkari 67519 108814 39549 1030119 na na na
31   Hatay 120274 62199 450285 1843133 na na na
32   Isparta 203062 106957 547539 2137483 na na na
33   İçel 210629 142663 359651 2026748 62115 377593 4,60
34   İstanbul 394890 92933 1045918 131850** 246901*** 2174466*** 9.4***
35   İzmir 349057 196692 934155 1440480 152753 1070833 5,90
36   Kars 63922 198090 123985 2241472 na na na
37 Kastamonu 96939 109751 311927 2946507 na na na
38   Kayseri na 45993 1147385 1510608 64512 574635 5,20
39   Kırklareli 130799 93260 3508980 2855098 na na na
40   Kırşehir 131235 179740 225447 2595071 na na na
41   Kocaeli 558518*** 280219 1593286 985644 47078 320756 5,00
42   Konya 183019 67851 418512 2364111 44208 300414 4,30
43   Kütahya 127460 111294 392954 1891029 na na na
44   Malatya 102450 177385 1073576 1187468 66491 390641 4,40
45   Manisa 125146 121049 355472 3082922 na na na
46   K.Maraş 93810 113702 2608305 1537514 na na na
47   Mardin 115290 27946 319415 1701119 na na na
48   Muğla 176160 497173 807307 3398768 na na na
49   Muş 63015 61119 33343 2293209 na na na
50   Nevşehir 184768 108230 306574 4137881 na na na
51   Niğde 167490 58778 822755 3454264 na na na
52   Ordu 115508 26552 113424 1401336 na na na
53   Rize 127675 50435 70096 1534513 na na na
54   Sakarya 163536 42226 793948 3176111 na na na
55   Samsun 126394 127146 161200 2197031 54287 337515 4,80
56   Siirt 81178 43746 44650 1377601 na na na
57   Sinop 127982 108682 146514 2016939 na na na
58   Sivas 109049 204098 283154 2591006 na na na
59   Tekirdağ 145158 161352 9339904*** 2531264 na na na
60   Tokat 137091 35729 209624 2300653 na na na
61   Trabzon 118997 78535 112913 1176179 37711 335102 8,10
62   Tunceli 222308 228741 23016 2394736 na na na
63   Urfa 73449 326877 361774 2148099 na na na
64   Uşak 123001 29609 715405 2531621 na na na
65   Van 63415 91654 45793 1128671 na na na
66   Yozgat 99258 83271 128239 2943882 na na na
67   Zonguldak 196995 236541 1170027 789824 39283 225393 5,00
68   Aksaray 124015 39886 315151 2584799 na na na
69   Bayburt 112008 111461 73210 2006351 na na na
70   Karaman 146551 104860 928183 4636169 na na na
71   Kırıkkale 148928 222777 208526 1390006 na na na
72   Batman 63974 62295 135437 1503971 na na na
73   Şırnak 56953 40348 109911 1864953 na na na
74   Bartın 81070 41698 831849 1185467 na na na
75   Ardahan 66560 23675 71988 3744971 na na na
76   Iğdır 61590 296951 580634 2218533 na na na
77   Yalova 161792 29637 984947 1313015 na na na
78   Karabük 162131 19590 1642549 990394 na na na
79   Kilis 125240 32201 270321 2201706 na na na
80   Osmaniye na 11278** 50961 na na na na
81   Düzce na na na na na na na
Average 215278 346914 889181 1761935 na na na
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BOT20pc / 
GDPpci
TOP20 / 
BOT20 PPDoctor SPTeacher rgrGDPpc NuTAXp rPersEXPcpc D1 D2
BOT20pc / 
GDPi pc
TOP20 / 
BOT20
PEOPLE PER 
DOCTOR (1996)
NUMBER OF 
STUDENTS / 
NUMBER OF 
TEACHERS 
1996
AVERAGE OF GDP 
PER CAPITA 
GROWTH RATE AT 
1987 PRICES
NUMBER OF 
TAX PAYERS 
AVERAGE OF 
PER CAPITA 
REAL BUDGET 
EXPENDITURE 
FOR 
PERSONNEL IN 
TL
EMERGENC
Y STATE 
REGIONS 
(DUMMY)
PRIORITY 
REGIONS FOR 
DEVELOPMEN
T  (DUMMY)
1   Adana 0,53 11*** 993 29 0,06 135755 548392 0 0
2   Adıyaman na na 2779 26 0,01 22736 342589 0 1
3   Afyon na na 2023 23 0,03 52214 337400 0 0
4   Ağrı na na 3366 31 0,03 15718 377355 0 1
5   Amasya na na 1373 18 0,03 25461 611893 0 1
6   Ankara 0,72 6,00 329** 19 0,04 383514 839940 0 0
7   Antalya 0,75 7,00 787 17 0,07 187841 437441 0 0
8   Artvin na na 1090 20 0,03 187841 652397 0 1
9   Aydın na na 969 15 0,04 101632 430432 0 0
10   Balıkesir na na 1257 16 0,02 117646 533912 0 0
11   Bilecik na na 1218 19 0,07 14001 440335 0 0
12   Bingöl na na 2355 22 0,03 9342 717268 0 1
13   Bitlis na na 2939 25 0,02 11527 503618 0 1
14   Bolu na na 1498 23 0,03 52322 409496 0 0
15   Burdur na na 1235 16 0,04 25331 520410 0 0
16   Bursa 0,56 6,91 934 21 0,04 198607 390827 0 0
17   Çanakkale na na 1201 18 0,03 45932 600554 0 1
18   Çankırı na na 1680 14 0,02 9786 459855 0 1
19   Çorum na na 1564 20 0,04 39947 350582 0 1
20   Denizli 0,85 7,20 1116 17 0,05 84989 387430 0 0
21   Diyarbakır 0,82 6,00 1610 31 0,01 51618 696512 1 1
22   Edirne na na 645 20 0,04 41612 713720 0 0
23   Elazığ na na 792 22 0,00 31555 1003168 0 1
24   Erzincan na na 1370 19 0,01 14575 603096 0 1
25   Erzurum 1.66*** 9,60 1023 23 0,00 38666 705669 0 1
26   Eskişehir 0,63 7,00 686 21 0,04 55774 893410 0 0
27   Gaziantep 0,63 5.00** 1771 34 0,04 87375 302896 0 0
28   Giresun na na 1988 26 0,03 32074 396688 0 0
29 Gumushane na na 1658 23 0,02 7595 478413 0 1
30   Hakkari na na 3629 32 0,08 4822 1059805 1 1
31   Hatay na na 1801 32 0,04 100412 326156 0 0
32   Isparta na na 795 15 0,05 30167 595349 0 0
33   İçel 0,60 6,00 1830 22 0,04 133067 378562 0 0
34   İstanbul 0,73 9,00 567 33 0,06 1379030*** 373413 0 0
35   İzmir 0,54 7,00 479 18 0,05 377220 584018 0 0
36   Kars na na 2131 27 0,03 15354 627419 0 1
37 Kastamonu na na 1124 19 0,04 17325 740073 0 1
38   Kayseri 0,80 8,90 920 30 0,05 64996 641973 0 0
39   Kırklareli na na 1106 22 0,02 33835 533195 0 0
40   Kırşehir na na 1479 29 0,02 13992 427678 0 0
41   Kocaeli 0.26** 6,81 1139 24 0,06 107579 638988 0 0
42   Konya 0,85 7,00 1274 20 0,03 141543 420194 0 0
43   Kütahya na na 1431 22 0,04 43630 340172 0 0
44   Malatya 1,13 5,90 1172 25 0,04 46812 572699 0 1
45   Manisa na na 1057 18 0,05 122136 325979 0 0
46   K.Maraş na na 2201 27 0,02 53678 316914 0 1
47   Mardin na na 3124 33 0,08 45739 495355 0 1
48   Muğla na na 1058 16 0,06 90577 459396 0 0
49   Muş na na 3464 27 0,01 7171 397662 0 1
50   Nevşehir na na 1371 19 0,05 24928 386407 0 0
51   Niğde na na 1387 23 0,03 21514 423442 0 0
52   Ordu na na 2222 24 0,04 47515 278678 0 0
53   Rize na na 1373 28 0,01 27410 365573 0 0
54   Sakarya na na 1581 25 0,06 76884 407803 0 0
55   Samsun 1,08 6,00 1002 23 0,02 85804 538206 0 0
56   Siirt na na 2558 23 0,04 8221 795272 1 1
57   Sinop na na 1192 13** 0,02 18270 536820 0 1
58   Sivas na na 1058 26 0,03 46453 598205 0 0
59   Tekirdağ na na 996 21 0,07 63158 466312 0 0
60   Tokat na na 1862 25 0,04 39833 355258 0 1
61   Trabzon 1,18 9,00 779 24 0,02 60120 597792 0 0
62   Tunceli na na 1239 22 (-0.026)** 3747** 1648677*** 1 1
63   Urfa na na 3068 25 0,10 78182 277996 0 1
64   Uşak na na 1402 16 0,04 30242 393052 0 0
65   Van na na 1975 35 0,03 30589 727038 1 1
66   Yozgat na na 1963 18 0,02 29253 307988 0 1
67   Zonguldak 0,71 6,00 1349 24 0,05 56344 405893 0 1
68   Aksaray na na 1574 25 0,09 20310 274466 0 0
69   Bayburt na na 1505 18 0,07 5569 443853 0 1
70   Karaman na na 1539 22 0,09 14197 300094 0 0
71   Kırıkkale na na 1806 26 0,04 19650 377480 0 1
72   Batman na na 3326 33 na 20126 411553 0 1
73   Şırnak na na 4897*** 37*** 0.156*** 14523 849993 1 1
74   Bartın na na 1499 16 0,08 16349 355583 0 1
75   Ardahan na na 1517 28 0,07 6216 448805 0 1
76   Iğdır na na 1762 24 0,07 9875 403052 0 1
77   Yalova na na 1242 20 na 21171 194751 0 0
78   Karabük na na 1397 20 na 22622 219282 0 1
79   Kilis na na 2656 18 na 9008 214624 0 1
80   Osmaniye na na 2589 na na 26247 143243** 0 1
81   Düzce na na na na na na na 0 0
Average na na 907 23 0,04 5695113 520458 0 0
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